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I. INTRODUCTION: RECOGNIZING THE SPECIAL NATURE OF YOUTH 
Canadian law has long recognized that because youths
1
 have limited 
capacities and greater vulnerability than adults, they should be afforded a 
special status in the criminal justice system. Since the Youth Criminal 
Justice Act [“YCJA”] came into force in April 2003, in a number of 
important decisions the Supreme Court has generally favoured a “pro-
youth” interpretation of Act, restricting the use of custody for young 
offenders and protecting their legal rights.
2
 The 2008 decision of the 
Supreme Court in R. v. B. (D.)
3
 significantly extended this protective 
approach, recognizing that the principle of the “diminished moral 
blameworthiness” of youth in the criminal justice system has not only a 
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1  A note on terminology: in this paper, the term “child” will generally be used to refer to 
persons under the age of 12, and “youth” or “adolescent” to refer to those 12 to 17 years inclusive. 
This is the way that the terms are generally used in Canada’s criminal justice laws, most notably the 
Youth Criminal Justice Act, S.C. 2002, c. 1. In some contexts, however, the terms “youth” and 
“child” are used synonymously to refer to persons under the age of 18.  
2  The decisions of the Supreme Court interpreting the sentencing provisions of the YCJA 
are R. v. D. (C.), [2005] S.C.J. No. 79, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 668 (S.C.C.); R. v. P. (B.W.), [2006] S.C.J. 
No. 27, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 941 (S.C.C.); R. v. B. (D.), [2008] S.C.J. No. 25, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.); 
and R. v. C. (S.A.), [2008 S.C.J. No. 48, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 675 (S.C.C.); on the legal rights of youth, 
see R. v. C. (R.W.), [2005] S.C.J. No. 62, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 99 (S.C.C.); R. v. M. (A.), [2008] S.C.J. 
No. 19, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 569 (S.C.C.) and R. v. H. (L.T.), [2008] S.C.J. No. 50, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 739 
(S.C.C.). The recent decision of the Court in R. v. L. (S.J.), [2009] S.C.J. No. 14, 2009 SCC 14 
(S.C.C.) also recognized the need to protect youth, and interpreted the YCJA as prohibiting the trial 
of a young person with an adult co-accused; however, the majority of the Court held that the Crown 
can prefer a direct indictment of a young person in youth court, denying youths a right to a 
preliminary inquiry in certain circumstances. Generally on the interpretation and application of the 
YCJA, see N. Bala, P.J. Carrington & J. Roberts, “Evaluating the Youth Criminal Justice Act After 
Five Years — A Qualified Success” (2009) 51 Can. J. Criminology & Crim. J. 131 [hereinafter 
“Bala, Carrington & Roberts”]. 
3  Id. 
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statutory basis, but also a constitutional foundation. While the Court was 
unanimous in accepting that the diminished moral blameworthiness of 
youth is a principle of fundamental justice, it was sharply divided in the 
application of this newly recognized principle. Writing for a five-
member majority of the Court, Abella J. ruled that provisions of the 
YCJA that impose an obligation on a youth found guilty of a very serious 
offence to justify not imposing an adult sentence are unconstitutional, 
while Rothstein J., writing for the dissent, argued that these provisions do 
not violate section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
4
 
as Parliament struck an appropriate balance in protecting society and 
recognizing the special needs of youth. The Court was also divided in its 
views about whether provisions of the YCJA creating a presumption of 
allowing for publication of identifying information about youths found 
guilty of very serious offences were constitutionally valid. The majority 
took a more expansive view of section 7 of the Charter, finding that the 
social and psychological stress associated with identifying publicity was 
engaged, and ruled this provision unconstitutional; the dissent took the 
position that stigma is not an aspect of liberty or security of the person, 
and in any event the publication of information about a youth is not state 
action.  
This commentary begins by discussing the context for the B. (D.) 
decision, explaining the role of adult sanctions for youthful offenders, 
and briefly describing the historical evolution of youth justice and adult 
sanctions for youth in Canada. The paper next considers previous 
conflicting appellate jurisprudence on the constitutionality of the 
provisions of the YCJA that allow for imposition of adult sanctions on 
youth, and then analyzes R. v. B. (D.). The paper concludes with a 
discussion of implications of B. (D.) for youth justice in Canada. 
Although R. v. B. (D.) is highly controversial,
5
 and the Court was deeply 
divided in the result, the Court has clearly given constitutional 
recognition to youth (being under 18 years of age at the time of 
commission of a crime) as being a status entitled to special protection 
under the Charter. This “constitutionalization of adolescence” makes this 
                                                                                                             
4  Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
5  A critical editorial characterized the majority decision as “baffling”: “Sleight-of-hand at 
the Supreme Court” (Editorial), The Globe and Mail, May 17, 2008, A20. In a relatively rare public 
response to a decision of the Court, the Minister of Justice issued a critical press release, stating that 
he was “disappointed” with the decision: “Statement From the Minister of Justice Concerning the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s Decision on R. v. D.B.”, May 16, 2008, <www.justice.gc.ca/eng/news-
nouv/nr-cp/2008/doc_32255.html>.  
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the most important judgment of the Court regarding youth offending in 
the history of Canada, and will both affect future judicial approaches to 
youth justice issues and constrain possible legislative reforms that might 
make the youth system more “adult-like”. The decision also suggests that 
a narrow majority of the Court is prepared to take a relatively broad 
approach to section 7 of the Charter. 
II. YOUTH JUSTICE AND ADULT SANCTIONING 
All juvenile justice systems have provisions that allow for the most 
serious of offenders to receive sanctions that are similar or identical to 
those imposed on adults. Some youths have committed offences that are 
so serious or pose such a great risk to society that it would be 
inappropriate to subject them to the limited sentences that are available 
under juvenile justice laws. The statutory provisions that allow for adult 
sanctions to be imposed on adolescents are significant not only for the 
youths directly involved but for the entire juvenile justice system, since 
they set an outer boundary for that system and help to define its nature. 
While these laws exist in some form throughout the world, there is great 
variation in the legislative provisions that allow for adult sanctions to be 
imposed on youths, and the provisions have been significantly changed 
in Canada over the years. 
In many American states, the decision about whether to seek an adult 
sentence is made by the prosecutor before trial, and any trial in such a 
case may be fully publicized. In some states adulthood commences for 
all criminal law purposes at the age of 16 years. Thousands of juveniles 
are serving sentences in adult prisons in the United States; in a majority 
of states, adolescents who commit murder can face life imprisonment 
without the possibility of parole.
6
 Significantly, however, the United 
States Supreme Court also recognized that there is a constitutional 
requirement that the nature of adolescence must be reflected in the legal 
treatment of adolescents in the criminal justice system. In 2005 in Roper 
v. Simmons,
7
 the U.S. Supreme Court held that it was “cruel and unusual 
                                                                                                             
6  C. De La Vega & M. Leighton, “Sentencing Our Children to Die in Prison: Global Law 
and Practice” (2008) 42 U.S.F. L. Rev. 983; and Jeffrey Fagan, “Juvenile Crime and Criminal 
Justice: Resolving Border Disputes” (2008) 18(2) The Future of Children 10-48. 
7  543 U.S. 551 (2005). Until 2005 some 20 states allowed for capital punishment of 
juveniles convicted of murder. In Roper v. Simmons, a 5-4 majority of the Supreme Court of the 
United States held that it is “cruel and unusual” punishment and a violation of the U.S. Constitution 
to allow for capital punishment of those who were under 18 years when they committed an offence, 
without exceptions based on the brutality of the crime or circumstances of the offender. The majority 
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punishment”, and hence in violation of the 8th Amendment of the 
American Constitution, to subject a person to capital punishment for a 
murder committed when he was under the age of 18 years.  
In Canada, the process for imposing adult sentences is judicially 
controlled. Those youths who receive adult sentences will generally only 
be placed in adult correctional facilities after reaching the age of 18 
years, and if they receive a life sentence for murder, are eligible for 
parole earlier than adults found guilty of the same offence. Although 
cases involving adult sentences for youths occur relatively rarely in 
Canada,
8
 these cases involve the most serious, brutal offences, and gain 
extensive media attention and public interest.  
III. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF YOUTH JUSTICE AND  
ADULT SANCTIONING 
A basic understanding of the history of Canada’s youth justice laws 
and the evolution of the provisions allowing for adult sanctions to be 
imposed is important for understanding the significance of R. v. B. (D.), 
and the Court itself (both the majority and the dissent) gave considerable 
attention to the historical development of juvenile justice law in Canada. 
Historically, children convicted of criminal offences were subjected 
to the same punishments as adults, including hanging, and children as 
young as eight years were incarcerated in Kingston Penitentiary. 
However, at common law, criminal liability started at the age of seven. A 
child between the ages of seven and 14 could raise a defence of doli 
incapax and would have criminal immunity if it were not proven by the 
prosecution that the child had the capacity to understand the “nature and 
consequences of his act and to appreciate that it was wrong”.9 In 1857 
the first Canadian legislation was enacted to separate convicted child and 
younger adolescent offenders from adults, placing them in juvenile 
reformatories rather than adult penitentiaries.  
                                                                                                             
of the U.S. Court cited the prohibition on capital punishment for juvenile offenders in the 
international Convention on the Rights of the Child, Can. T.S. 1992, No. 3, even though the United 
States is not a signatory. Interestingly, the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. B. (D.) did not mention 
this American decision, even though it dealt with a similar issue and came to a similar conclusion. 
8  There is no national data available for adult sentencing under the YCJA, but under the 
Young Offenders Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. Y-1 fewer than 100 cases per year were transferred for trial 
into adult court and it would appear that well under 100 youths per year are receiving adult sentences 
under the YCJA. 
9 Latin for “incapacity to do wrong”; see S.S. Anand, “Catalyst for Change: The History of 
Canadian Juvenile Justice Reform” (1998) 24 Queen’s L.J. 515. 
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The Juvenile Delinquents Act was enacted in 1908,
10
 creating a 
separate juvenile justice and corrections system with a welfare-oriented 
philosophy for youthful offenders. The age jurisdiction of the Juvenile 
Court varied by province, with most provinces beginning adult 
jurisdiction at the age of 16 years, but a few extending Juvenile Court 
jurisdiction to the 18th birthday. Thus, interestingly, for most of Canada 
the age of commencement of adulthood for criminal law purposes was, 
until relatively recently, 16 years of age, an issue ignored by the Supreme 
Court in R. v. B. (D.), where the Court accepted that the age of 18 years 
is the commencement of adulthood. Although the issue of the age range 
for special constitutional protection was accepted without discussion by 
the Court,
11
 it was unanimous on this point and this position is consistent 
with international treaties like the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, so it must now be accepted as an established part of 
Canadian constitutional law that “adulthood”, at least for criminal law 
purposes, commences at the age of 18. 
Under the JDA there was a relatively informal process to allow for 
the transfer of juveniles aged 14 years or older and charged with serious 
offences into adult court for trial and, if there was a conviction, to have 
an adult sentence imposed. A juvenile who was transferred into adult 
court for trial under the JDA and whose bail was denied was immediately 
detained in an adult facility pending adult trial and, if convicted of 
murder, faced the full adult sentence, including the prospect of a capital 
sentence (while this was a punishment in Canada).
12
  
                                                                                                             
10 Juvenile Delinquents Act, enacted S.C. 1908, c. 40; subject to minor amendments over 
the years, finally as Juvenile Delinquents Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. J-3 [hereinafter “JDA”]. For a 
discussion of the Act, including issues of varying age jurisdiction by province, see Larry Wilson, 
Juvenile Courts in Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1982). 
11  In his dissent, Rothstein J. discussed some of the historical developments in the treatment 
of young offenders in Canada, and in particular the variation in approaches to the imposition of adult 
sentences on youth, adults (at paras. 132-138), but he did not explicitly mention the variation in the 
age jurisdiction of Juvenile Court and the changes in the concepts of “childhood”, “youth” and 
“adulthood”. By way of contrast, the United States Supreme Court in Roper v. Simmons, supra, note 
7, had a fairly extensive discussion of the rationale for selecting the age of 18 years as the start of 
adult accountability in terms of capital punishment. The U.S. Court recognized that selection of any 
age is somewhat “arbitrary”, but considered 18 years most consistent with brain development 
literature and international norms. Perhaps the American Court felt more of an obligation to discuss 
this issue because a number of American states still start adult criminal responsibility at 16 or 17 
years of age. 
12  Steven Truscott was the last juvenile to face a capital sentence, though his sentence was 
later commuted. He was eventually released on parole and much later exonerated. See Isabel 
Lebourdais, The Trial of Steven Truscott (London: Gollancz, 1966); and Julian Sher, Until You Are 
Dead: Steven Truscott’s Long Ride into History (Toronto: Knopf Canada, 2001). 
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The Young Offenders Act
13
 (in force from 1984 to 2003) established 
a uniform national age jurisdiction for youth courts from 12 years 
through to 18th birthday, an important statutory recognition of 
adolescence as a distinct stage of life, with children under 12 years 
immune from criminal liability and with full adult liability starting at the 
age of 18 years. The YOA allowed for a pre-trial application to be made 
to have a youth aged 14 years or older tried in adult court, and if 
convicted there, subject to an adult sentence. In dealing with transfer, the 
youth court judge was to consider a broad range of evidence, some of 
which was inadmissible in a criminal trial, to determine which court, 
corrections system and legal regime were preferable for dealing with 
the youth. In 1992, the Progressive Conservative government amended 
the transfer provisions of the YOA to stipulate that the “protection of the 
public” was to be the paramount consideration, though also rendering 




In 1995 the Liberal government enacted another set of amendments 
to the Act, again primarily intended to demonstrate to the public that it 
was getting “tougher”, in particular for the most violent youthful 
offenders.
15
 While the 1995 amendments offered some protection to 
youth by providing that even if an adult sentence was imposed, a youth 
could remain in a youth corrections facility until reaching adulthood, a 
central feature of these amendments was the creation of the “presumptive 
offence”. The 1995 amendments to the YOA introduced a category of 
charges for which a 16- or 17-year-old youth would presumptively be 
dealt with in adult court, unless the young person satisfied a youth court 
judge that the case should be dealt with in the youth system.
16
 For 16- 
and 17-year-old youths charged with murder, attempted murder, 
manslaughter or aggravated sexual assault, the youth had the onus to 
show why the case should not be dealt with in adult court. For all other 
offences for older youths, and for 14- and 15-year-old youths charged 
                                                                                                             
13  R.S.C. 1985, c. Y-1, enacted as S.C. 1980-81-82-83, c. 110 [hereinafter “YOA”]. 
14  An Act to amend the Young Offenders Act and the Criminal Code, S.C. 1992, c. 11. See 
N. Bala, “Dealing with Violent Young Offenders: Transfer to Adult Court and Bill C-58” (1990) 9 
Can. J. Fam. L. 11. 
15  An Act to amend the Young Offenders Act and the Criminal Code, S.C. 1995, c. 19. See 
N. Bala, “The 1995 Young Offenders Act Amendments: Compromise or Confusion?” (1994) 26 
Ottawa L. Rev. 643.  
16  In theory, the Crown could also make an application under s. 16(1.01) of the YOA to 
have charges against a 16- or 17-year-old for a presumptive offence murder to be “transferred down” 
into the youth court for trial, in which the Crown would have the onus of justifying this outcome. In 
practice, it was the youth who made the application. 
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with any offence, including the presumptive offences, there was an onus 
under the YOA on the Crown to satisfy the court that the case should be 
transferred. There is often real difficulty in determining how a youth will 
respond to the rehabilitative services provided in custody and how great 
a future danger a youth may pose to society. Accordingly, the onus under 




A major objective of the Youth Criminal Justice Act, which came 
into effect in 2003 and continued the 12 to 18 years of age jurisdiction of 
the YOA, was to reduce the use of the courts and custody for the 
majority of adolescent offenders. The Act has had significant success in 
achieving this objective.
18
 However, at the time the YCJA was 
introduced, the Liberal government also prominently publicized aspects 
of the Act intended “to respond more firmly and effectively to the small 
number of the most serious, violent young offenders” in order to address 
the “disturbing decline in public confidence in the youth justice system” 
in Canada.
19
 To expedite the decision-making process about adult 
sentences, the YCJA eliminated the time-consuming pre-trial transfer 
hearing, and provides that the decision about whether to impose an adult 
sanction is to be made only if there is a conviction as part of sentencing.  
Significantly, the YCJA extended the concept of the “presumptive 
offence”, adding the new third “serious violent offence” to the YOA list 
of the four enumerated most serious offences (murder, attempted murder, 
manslaughter and aggravated sexual assault). Further, the YCJA reduced 
the age for presumptive offences. While youths aged 14 years or over 
were subject to transfer under the YOA, it was only 16- and 17-year-olds 
charged with the most serious offences who were presumed liable to an 
adult sentence. The YCJA lowered to 14 years the age at which an onus 
to justify a youth sentence was placed on the youth found guilty of a 
presumptive offence.
20
 For presumptive offences, section 72 provided 
that a youth court judge was required to impose an adult sentence on 
youths 14 years or older at the date of the offence, unless the young 
                                                                                                             
17 R. v. H. (H.A.), [2000] O.J. No. 4200, 51 O.R. (3d) 321 (Ont. C.A.). 
18  See Bala, Carrington & Roberts, supra, note 2. 
19  Then Justice Minister Anne McLellan (Press Release, Canada, Department of Justice, 
May 12, 1999). See also Anne McLellan, Hansard, Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional 
Affairs, Hearings on Bill C-7, September 27, 2001. 
20 Section 61 allows a province to select 15 or 16 as the age for the presumptive regime of 
the YCJA. Quebec and Newfoundland chose 16 years as the minimum age for presumptive adult 
sentencing. 
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person could satisfy the onus of establishing that a youth sentence would 
be of “sufficient length” to hold the youth “accountable”. 
If an adult sentence is imposed, section 76 of the YCJA creates a 
presumption that a young person who is under 18 years of age at the time 
of receiving the adult sentence will be placed in a youth custody facility, 
with provisions for transfer to an adult facility upon reaching the age of 
18. However, the sentencing court may order that a youth under the age 
of 18 and subject to an adult sentence is to be placed in an adult facility if 
this is in the “best interests” of the young person or necessary to ensure 
“the safety of others”. If a person who was a youth at the time of the 
offence receives a life sentence for murder, there will be eligibility for 
parole at an earlier date than an adult, reflecting the limited accountability 
of even those youths convicted of the most serious offences and receiving 
an adult sentence.  
IV. CONFLICTING APPELLATE DECISIONS PRIOR TO  
R. V. B. (D.) 
1. The Quebec Court of Appeal in Québec v. Canada 
Prior to the YCJA coming into effect, the Quebec government 
brought a reference case before the Court of Appeal in that province, 
arguing that several provisions of the YCJA, including those governing 
adult sentencing and allowing for the publication of identifying 
information about young offenders found guilty of serious offences, are 
incompatible with international law and in violation of the Charter. Just 
before the YCJA came into effect, a five-judge panel of the Court of 
Appeal rendered its decision in Reference re Bill C-7 respecting the 
criminal justice system for young persons [Québec v. Canada],
21
 holding 
that the “principles of fundamental justice” in section 7 of the Charter 
include the right of young persons to treatment separate from adults. The 
Court based its approach to section 7 of the Charter both on the long 
history of special treatment of juvenile offenders in the Canadian justice 
system and on international law, in particular the Convention on the 
                                                                                                             
21  [2003] Q.J. No. 2850, 10 C.R. (6th) 281 (Que. C.A.) [hereinafter “Québec v. Canada”]. 
For a fuller discussion of this decision, see S. Anand & N. Bala, “The Quebec Court of Appeal Youth 
Justice Reference: Striking Down the Toughest Part of the New Act” (2003) 10 C.R. (6th) 397. 
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Rights of the Child.
22
 The Court ruled that the “principles of fundamental 
justice” include recognition that:23 
(1)  The treatment of young offenders in the criminal justice system 
must be separate and different from the treatment of adults. 
(2)  Rehabilitation, not repression and deterrence, must be the basis of 
legislative and judicial intervention involving young offenders. 
(3)  The youth justice system must restrict disclosure of the identity of 
minors in order to prevent stigmatization, which could limit 
rehabilitation.  
(4)  The youth justice system must consider the best interests of the 
child.  
Some of these principles are very broad and, as discussed below, the 
fourth (the “best interests principle”) is clearly inconsistent with subsequent 
Supreme Court jurisprudence. However, the Quebec Court of Appeal 
limited the effect of these principles by engaging in an internal balancing 
exercise within section 7 when applying them. Consistent with prior 
Supreme Court of Canada section 7 Charter jurisprudence,
24
 the Court of 
Appeal held that these principles must be applied so as to strike a 
“certain balance” between the public’s right to be protected and the right 
of youths to be treated differently from adults and to have rehabilitation 
as the main focus of decisions that concern them.
25
  
The Quebec Court of Appeal ruled unconstitutional section 72(2) of 
the YCJA, which places an onus on youths 14 years of age or older and 
found guilty of a “presumptive offence” to justify why they should be 
sentenced as youths rather than as adults. The Court concluded that this 
provision places an “excessive burden [on youth], considering the 
vulnerability of the young persons on whom it rests and the purposes” of 
the YCJA.
26
 Consistent with its articulation of a principle of prevention 
of stigmatization of youth, the Court of Appeal also held that sections 75 
and 110(2)(b) violate section 7 of the Charter to the extent that they 
impose on a young person the burden of justifying maintenance of a 
                                                                                                             
22  Can. T.S. 1992 No. 3. 
23  Québec v. Canada, supra, note 21, at paras. 215 and 231. 
24  See Cunningham v. Canada, [1993] S.C.J. No. 47, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 143 (S.C.C.). The 
concept of “internal balancing” is distinguished from the “external balancing” that is required when 
s. 1 of the Charter is invoked.  
25  Québec v. Canada, supra, note 21, at para. 237. 
26  Id., at para. 249.  
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publication ban rather than imposing on the prosecutor the burden of 
justifying lifting the ban.  
In May 2003, in response to the Quebec Court of Appeal judgment, 
the then federal Liberal government announced that the decision would 
not be appealed, and that it would “soon” introduce amendments to the 
YCJA to make the Act consistent with that decision. The purpose of 
these amendments would have been to ensure a uniform national 
response, and to resolve some procedural issues about how and when an 
adult sentence can be imposed. In fact, legislative amendments to deal 
with this issue were not introduced. 
2. The British Columbia Court of Appeal: R. v. T. (K.D.)  
In its January 2006 decision in R. v. T. (K.D.),
27
 the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal declined to follow the decision of the Quebec Court of 
Appeal, and upheld the constitutional validity of section 72(2). The 
British Columbia Court held that section 7 of the Charter does not 
include as a principle of fundamental justice that young offenders are 
presumptively to be treated differently from adults.  
One important reason that the British Columbia Court gave for 
rejecting the approach of the Quebec Court
28
 was that the fourth 
“principle of fundamental justice” which the Quebec Court recognized, 
that the youth court system must make decisions that “consider the best 
interests of the child”, was rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada in 
its 2004 decision in Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the 
Law v. Canada.
29
 In that case McLachlin C.J.C. wrote for the majority, 
upholding the constitutional validity of section 43 of the Criminal 
Code,
30
 which authorizes use of reasonable force for the purpose of 
correction of children. In the course of her judgment, she concluded that 
requiring decisions to be made in accordance with the “best interests of 
the child” is not a principle of fundamental justice, as the principle is too 
vague to be given constitutional effect.  
While it is true that this fourth principle — the best interests 
principle — was rejected as a principle of fundamental justice by the 
Supreme Court in Canadian Foundation for Children, the Quebec Court 
                                                                                                             
27  [2006] B.C.J. No. 253, 37 C.R. (6th) 243 (B.C.C.A.). 
28  Id., at para. 29. 
29  [2004] S.C.J. No. 6, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 76 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Canadian Foundation for 
Children”]. 
30  R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
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did not even mention this particular principle in dealing with the Charter 
challenge to section 72(2), but rather focused on the first three of the 
principles — that youths must be treated separately from adults and in a 
way that focuses on their rehabilitation and protects their privacy.  
Another argument that the British Columbia Court of Appeal 
considered significant is that section 72(2) of the YCJA does “not place 
an onerous burden on the convicted youth”. In taking this approach to 
section 72(2), the Court placed significant emphasis on an interpretation 
given to the transfer provisions of the YOA by the Supreme Court of 
Canada in its 1989 decision in R. v. M. (S.H.), where McLachlin J. (as 
she then was) wrote:  
[T]hat application of the concepts of burden and onus to the transfer 
provisions of the YOA may not be helpful … Nor do I find it helpful to 
cast the issue in terms of a civil or criminal standard of proof. Those 
concepts are typically concerned with establishing whether something 
took place. … But it is less helpful to ask oneself whether a young 
person should be tried in ordinary court “on a balance of probabilities.” 
One is not talking about something which is probable or improbable 
when one enters into the exercise of … weighing and balancing all the 
relevant considerations, [to decide whether] … the case should be 
transferred to ordinary court.
31
 
Despite the reliance of the British Columbia Court of Appeal on this 
passage, it is not relevant for deciding about the interpretation or 
constitutionality of section 72(2) of the YCJA, since the Supreme Court 
in R. v. M. (S.H.) was considering the 1984 version of the YOA, which 
placed no onus on any party at a transfer hearing, but simply stated that 
the youth court was to be “satisfied” that transfer should occur. It was 
only in 1995 that the YOA was amended to introduce the concept 
“presumptive offences”, placing an onus on youths charged with one of 
these most serious offences to satisfy the court they should not be tried as 
adults.
32
 It is that onus provision, reworked in the YCJA section 72(2), 
which is the subject of controversy in R. v. B. (D.).  
It is true that in practice, even if the onus is on the Crown, the youth 
is still very likely to adduce evidence about his or her background and 
character, and to attempt to establish that he or she is likely to be 
rehabilitated within the youth justice system. However, there are clearly 
                                                                                                             
31  [1989] S.C.J. No. 93, 50 C.C.C. (3d) 503, at 546 (S.C.C.), quoted by the B.C. Court of 
Appeal, supra, note 27, at para. 59 (emphasis omitted). 
32  YOA, s. 16(1.1), as enacted by S.C. 1995, c. 19. 
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cases in which the issue of onus will be determinative of the outcome, 
and R. v. T. (K.D.) may well have been one of them. It is notable that in 
T. (K.D.) the trial judge found that section 72(2) was unconstitutional, 
placed an onus on the Crown and decided not to impose an adult 
sentence, while the Court of Appeal upheld the constitutionality of the 
provision, placed an onus on the youth and imposed an adult sentence.  
3.  The Ontario Court of Appeal: R. v. B. (D.) 
Just six weeks after the British Columbia Court of Appeal decision in 
R. v. T. (K.D.), the Ontario Court of Appeal rendered its contrary 
decision in R. v. B. (D.),
33
 agreeing with the 2003 Quebec Court of 
Appeal ruling that section 72(2) of the YCJA violates section 7 of the 
Charter. In B. (D.), a 17-year-old youth punched another youth without 
warning (a “sucker punch”) while they watched two other adolescents 
fight; the young offender knocked the victim to the ground, punched the 
victim while he was on the ground and then fled. By the time the 
paramedics arrived, the victim had no vital signs, and he died shortly 
afterwards at the hospital. The youth was arrested the following day and 
pleaded guilty to manslaughter. As he was 17 years old, the Crown 
sought to apply the presumptive offence provisions of section 72(2). The 
trial judge, however, accepted the youth’s argument that sections 72(2) 
and 75 of the YCJA violate section 7 of the Charter, and placed the onus 
on the Crown to justify an adult sentence as necessary to hold the youth 
“accountable”.  
The youth had prior findings of guilt for possession of stolen 
property and robbery involving threats and intimidation, and had mental 
health issues as well as a history of behavioural problems in school. He 
expressed remorse and took some positive steps while in pre-sentence 
detention, and a court-ordered assessment report recommended treatment 
in a structured youth-oriented environment to reduce the risk of him re-
offending. The trial judge rejected the Crown’s application and sentenced 
the youth to the maximum youth sentence, an intensive rehabilitative 
custody and supervision order for a period of three years, lengthening the 
effective sentence by denying the youth any credit for the one year he 
                                                                                                             
33  [2006] O.J. No. 1112, 37 C.R. (6th) 265 (Ont. C.A.). The Ontario decision also followed 
the Quebec judgment in ruling that ss. 75 and 110(2)(b) of the YCJA violate s. 7 of the Charter, by 
imposing on the youth found guilty of a presumptive offence but not subject to adult sanction the 
onus to justify a ban on the publication of identifying information. 
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spent in pre-trial custody. The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, as 
did the Supreme Court of Canada. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal decision discussed the importance of 
the section 72(2) onus, concluding that it is “significant”, involving both 
a tactical onus of adducing evidence and a burden of persuasion, and 
observing that, at least in theory, for presumptive offences, the Crown 
might succeed in having an adult sentence imposed even if it introduced 
no evidence or argument to justify this result.
34
 The Ontario Court of 
Appeal also rejected the argument of the Crown that section 1 of the 
Charter could be invoked to save this provision, noting that the Crown 
conceded that it faces a very significant onus in trying to save any 




While the outcome of the constitutional challenge was the same in 
the Ontario and Quebec Court of Appeal decisions, the Ontario judgment 
is narrower, both in its scope and in its analysis. The Ontario Court 
recognized that the 2004 decision of the Supreme Court in Canadian 
Foundation for Children had an impact on how section 7 of the Charter 
should be applied. As noted by the Ontario Court of Appeal, the Supreme 
Court held that in deciding what constitutes a principle of fundamental 
justice, consideration must be given to both the “traditions that [establish] 
the basic norms for how the state deals with its citizens” and to international 
law.
36
 The Ontario Court concluded that both of these factors support 
acceptance as a principle of fundamental justice that there is a “need to 
treat young persons separately and not as adults in administering criminal 
justice”,37 and placed a burden on the Crown to justify the imposition of 
an adult sentence and the lifting of the publication ban.
38
  
                                                                                                             
34  Id., at paras. 35 and 68. 
35  Id., at paras. 81-83. 
36  Id., at para. 52, quoting from the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Canadian 
Foundation for Children, supra, note 29, at para. 8. 
37  R. v. B. (D.), id., at at para. 53.  
38  Id.  
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V. THE SUPREME COURT IN R. V. B. (D.) 
1.  “Presumption of Diminished Moral Blameworthiness” 
In May 2008, the Supreme Court rendered its decision in R. v. 
B. (D.),
39
 ruling that the presumption of adult sentencing in section 72(2) 
of the YCJA violates section 7 of the Charter. In coming to this 
conclusion, Abella J.
40
 took a somewhat different approach to section 7 
of the Charter than the Ontario Court of Appeal in D. (B.), and a clearly 
narrower approach than the Quebec Court of Appeal in Québec v. 
Canada. Justice Abella observed that those two appellate courts accepted 
the principle “that young persons should be dealt with separately from 
adults based on their reduced maturity”.41 While she agreed that this is 
“important”, she concluded that this principle was not engaged in this 
case, as the YCJA already established a separate youth justice system. 
Justice Abella based her analysis on the “widely acknowledged [fact] 
that age plays a role in the development of judgment and moral 
sophistication”, accepting this “reality” largely on the basis of judicial 
notice.
42
 Accordingly, she held that “because of their age, young people 
have heightened vulnerability, less maturity and a reduced capacity for 
moral judgment”, and it is a “principle of fundamental justice” that there 
is a “presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness or culpability” 
for those under the age of 18.
43
  
In coming to this conclusion, she found that this principle met all 
three of the requirements of a principle of fundamental justice, as set out 
by the Court in R. v. Malmo-Levine; R. v. Caine.
44
 She reviewed the 
historical treatment of children under the common law defence of doli 
incapax and the enactment of Canada’s youth justice legislation and wrote:  
                                                                                                             
39  Supra, note 2.  
40  Id., McLachlin C.J.C. and Binnie, LeBel and Fish JJ. concurring. 
41  Id., at para. 40. 
42  Id., at paras. 60 and 62. She quoted from three legal and one criminology text to establish 
this proposition: Nicholas Bala, Youth Criminal Justice Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2003); Allan 
Manson, The Law of Sentencing (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001); Gilles Renaud, Speaking to Sentence: 
A Practical Guide (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2004); and A.N. Doob, V. Marinos & K.N. Varma, 
Youth Crime and the Youth Justice System in Canada: A Research Perspective (Toronto: Centre of 
Criminology, University of Toronto, 1995), at 56-71. 
43  R. v. B. (D.), id., at para. 41. 
44  [2003] S.C.J. No. 79, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571, at para. 113 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Malmo-
Levine”]. She concluded (id., at para. 125) that the “presumption of reduced moral blameworthiness 
of young persons is (1) a legal principle (2) about which there is significant societal consensus that it 
is fundamental to the way the legal system ought to fairly operate and (3) it is sufficiently precise to 
yield a manageable standard against which to measure deprivations of life, liberty or security of the 
person”. 
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Canada … has consistently acknowledged the diminished responsibility 
and distinctive vulnerability of young persons in all of the YCJA’s 
statutory predecessors 
. . . . . 
This legislative history confirms that the recognition of a presumption 
of diminished moral blameworthiness for young persons is a long-
standing legal principle 
. . . . . 
[This] confirms, in my view, that a broad consensus reflecting society’s 
values and interests exists, namely that the principle of a presumption 
of diminished moral blameworthiness in young persons is fundamental 
to our notions of how a fair legal system ought to operate.
45
 
In concluding that the principle of diminished moral blameworthiness 
of youth is a principle of fundamental justice, Abella J. considered 
international law as well as domestic legal history. She emphasized that 
Canada has ratified the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, which recognizes the special vulnerability of those under the age 
of 18, and observed:  
This consensus also exists internationally … “[e]very legal system 
recognizes that children and youths are different from adults and should 
not be held accountable for violations of the criminal law in the same 
fashion as adults” … This is so because “generally speaking, the 
assumption is that the youthfulness of an offender mitigates the 
punishment that youths should receive and that youths should be kept 
separate from adult offenders.”46  
Significantly Rothstein J., writing for the dissent, accepted that the 
principles of fundamental justice include two principles relevant to this 
case, namely, that young persons have reduced moral blameworthiness 
for criminal conduct, and that the Crown has the burden of proving 
aggravating sentencing factors beyond a reasonable doubt. His dissent 
dealt with the application rather than the acceptance of these principles.  
2.  Unconstitutionality of Reverse Onus for Adult Sentence 
In deciding that the presumption of adult sentencing violates the 
Charter principle of diminished moral blameworthiness of youth, Abella 
                                                                                                             
45  R. v. B. (D.), supra, note 2, at paras. 48, 59 and 68.  
46  Id., at para. 67 (references omitted). 
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J. noted that section 72(2) creates an onus that “implicates three elements 
— procedural, tactical and persuasive”. She concluded that that creates 
an unconstitutional “reverse onus” on youth: 
Because the presumptive sentence is an adult one, the young person 
must provide the court with the information and counter-arguments to 
justify a youth sentence. If the young person fails to persuade the court 
that a youth sentence is sufficiently lengthy based on the factors set out 
in s. 72(1), an adult sentence must be imposed. This forces the young 
person to rebut the presumption of an adult sentence, rather than 
requiring the Crown to justify an adult sentence. It is therefore a reverse 
onus. 
… [T]he onus provisions in the presumptive offences sentencing 
regime stipulate that it is the offence, rather than the age of the person, 
that determines how he or she should be sentenced. This clearly 
deprives young people of the benefit of the presumption of diminished 
moral blameworthiness based on age. By depriving them of this 
presumption because of the crime and despite their age, and by putting 
the onus on them to prove that they remain entitled to the procedural 
and substantive protections to which their age entitles them, including a 




Justice Abella also held that the presumption of adult sentencing for a 
youth violates another principle of fundamental justice, namely, that the 
onus should always be on the Crown to establish aggravating circumstances 
that would justify imposing a more severe sanction on a person: 
The onus on the young person of satisfying the court of the 
sufficiency of the factors in s. 72(1) so that a youth sentence can be 
imposed also contravenes what the Crown concedes … is another 
principle of fundamental justice, namely, that the Crown is obliged to 
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, any aggravating factors in 
sentencing on which it relies. Putting the onus on the young person to 
prove the absence of aggravating factors in order to justify a youth 
sentence, rather than on the Crown to prove the aggravating factors that 
justify a lengthier adult sentence, reverses the onus.
48
  
Although ruling that a presumption of adult sentencing violates the 
Charter, the majority of the Court clearly accepted that adult sentences 
for young offenders are not per se unconstitutional, as long as the onus is 
                                                                                                             
47  Id., at paras. 75 and 76 (emphasis in original). 
48  Id., at para. 78 (emphasis in original). 
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on the Crown to establish that “the seriousness of the offence and the 
circumstances of the offender” justify this sanction, notwithstanding his 
or her age.
49 
Justice Abella undertook a relatively brief section 1 analysis, 
beginning by noting that “violations of s. 7 are seldom salvageable by 
s. 1,”50 and concluding that the onus requirements regarding adult 
sentencing and publication of identifying information do not survive 
either the rational connection or minimal impairment branches of the 
section 1 analysis. She observed that Parliament’s objectives of account-
ability, protection of the public and public confidence in the administration 
of justice can as easily be met by placing the onus on the Crown, while 
placing the onus on young persons is inconsistent with the presumption 
of their diminished moral blameworthiness. 
Justice Rothstein wrote a vigorous dissent, arguing that the presumptive 
offence sentencing provisions of the YCJA do not violate section 7 of the 
Charter.
51
 He argued that fundamental justice does not require that there 
is always a “presumption of youth sentences for young persons”, as this 
presumption failed to satisfy the test of Malmo-Levine;
52
 there is a lack 
of “sufficient precision” as to what constitutes a youth sentence to allow 
this to be a principle of fundamental justice; and further there is “no 
societal consensus that such a presumption is a vital component” of 
Canadian “notions of justice”.53 Taking a more deferential approach to 
legislators than the majority, he observed that in enacting the presumptive 
offence scheme, it was appropriate for Parliament to “balance” the 
competing interests, on the one hand, of youth to have their reduced 
moral blameworthiness taken into account and, on the other, of society to 
be protected from violent young offenders and to have confidence that 
the youth justice system ensures the accountability of violent young 
offenders. He concluded that this balancing was a legitimate exercise of 
Parliament’s authority to determine how best to penalize particular criminal 
activity.  
                                                                                                             
49  Id., at para. 77. 
50  Id., at para. 89. 
51  Justices Deschamps, Charron and Bastarache concurring. 
52  Supra, note 44, at para. 113.  
53  R. v. B. (D.), supra, note 2, at para. 131. 
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3.  Unconstitutionality of Reverse Onus for Publication of 
Identifying Information 
Like the previous youth justice legislation, the YCJA has provisions 
that generally prohibit the publication of identifying information about 
youths involved in the criminal justice system, based on the belief that 
such publication can make their rehabilitation and reintegration into 
society more difficult, and is inconsistent with notions of limited 
accountability.  
One of the major public criticisms of the YOA was that it denied the 
public the right to know the identity of violent young offenders who 
might pose a risk to their community after their release. At least in part 
this concern may have been fed by media that feel constrained by the 
restrictions on the publication of certain types of information, though it is 
far from clear that allowing the publication of the identity of young 
offenders actually does anything to promote community safety. Indeed, 
to the extent that publicizing the identity of young offenders and their 
resulting stigmatization may make rehabilitation and reintegration into 
society more difficult, identifying youth in the media may actually 
increase the risk to the public. However, in response to public and 
political pressure, as enacted, the YCJA provided more scope for the 
publication of identifying information about adolescents who are convicted 
of serious violent offences.  
Similar to the provisions of the YOA, under the YCJA if a decision 
is made to impose an adult sentence on a young offender, the provisions 
of the YCJA that prevent the publication of identifying information no 
longer apply. Further, the YCJA reduced protections afforded youth 
under the YOA, permitting a youth court to make an order allowing for 
publication of identifying information about a youth aged 14 years or 
older and found guilty of a “presumptive offence”, even if the court 
decided not to impose an adult sentence. Subsection 75(3) required a 
youth court dealing with this issue to determine whether it considered 
publication “appropriate in the circumstances, taking into account the 
importance of rehabilitating the young person and the public interest”.  
Subsection 75(1) placed the burden on the applicant (inevitably the 
young person) to establish that a publication ban should be imposed if 
the youth were found guilty of a presumptive offence. However, in R. v. 
B. (D.),
54
 after concluding that the presumption of adult sentencing for 
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those youth found guilty of the most serious offences violated the 
Charter, Abella J. also ruled that the “reverse onus” on the prohibition on 
publication of identifying information contained in section 75 of the 
YCJA was unconstitutional.
55
 She took a broad view of section 7 of the 
Charter, observing that the “greater psychological and social stress”56 
resulting from identifying publicity renders a sentence “significantly 
more severe”. She ruled that the lifting of the ban on publication of 
identifying information is an aspect of sentencing, and hence engages 
section 7 of the Charter: 
Similarly, I see the onus on young persons to demonstrate why they 
remain entitled to the ongoing protection of a publication ban to be a 
violation of s. 7 … the effect of the reverse onus provisions is that if a 
young person is unable to persuade the court that a youth sentence 
should be imposed, an adult sentence is imposed. When an adult 
sentence is imposed, the young person loses the protection of a 
publication ban. But even if the young person succeeds in discharging 
the reverse onus and receives a youth sentence, the YCJA imposes an 
additional onus by requiring the young person to apply for the ban that 
normally accompanies a youth sentence.  
In s. 3(1)(b)(iii) of the YCJA, as previously noted, the young person’s 
“enhanced procedural protection … including their right to privacy”, is 
stipulated to be a principle to be emphasized in the application of the 
Act. Scholars agree that “[p]ublication increases a youth’s self-perception 
as an offender, disrupts the family’s abilities to provide support, and 
negatively affects interaction with peers, teachers, and the surrounding 
community.”57  
On the issue of the constitutional validity of section 75(3), Rothstein 
J. also dissented, concluding that this provision does not engage section 7 
of the Charter. He argued that a youth’s right to liberty and security of 
the person are not affected by such an order, as a publication ban is not 
part of the sentence, nor does it physically restrain youths or prevent 
them from making fundamental personal choices. Further, to the extent 
that a youth may be stigmatized by publication of identifying information, 
this does not involve state action, but rather is caused by the media, and 
                                                                                                             
55  Id., at para. 95. 
56  Id., at para. 87. 
57  Id., at paras. 83 and 84 (emphasis in original), quoting from Nicholas Bala, Young 
Offenders Law (Concord, ON: Irwin Law, 1997), at 215. A statutory prerequisite to putting the onus 
on the young person to justify a publication ban on his or her identifying information was that the 
Crown had made an unsuccessful application to have an adult sentence imposed on the young 
person. 
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hence the Charter is not engaged. Justice Rothstein took a narrower 
approach to the scope of section 7 of the Charter than the majority; his 
approach seems less consistent with previous jurisprudence that has 
recognized the psychological as well as the physical aspects of “liberty 
and security of the person”.58 
Despite the majority decision in R. v. B. (D.), the publication of 
identifying information about a youth is in theory still permitted even if 
the young person receives a youth sentence, with the Crown bearing the 
burden of justifying removal of the publication ban. In practice, however, 
if a youth court decides not to impose an adult sentence, an application 
by the Crown seems unlikely to satisfy the test of subsection 75(3), and 
R. v. B. (D.) has effectively ended the possibility of publication of 
identifying information about youths who are not subject to an adult 
sentence. 
VI. RESPONDING TO SERIOUS YOUTH OFFENCES IN A 
CONSTITUTIONAL FASHION 
Some adolescents commit very violent crimes; their impulsiveness, 
lack of foresight and limited moral development can result in callous, 
senseless acts that have tragic consequences and understandably shock 
their communities. Fortunately these crimes are relatively rare, but their 
relative infrequency and their often brutal nature contribute to the 
heightened media and public attention when they do occur. There are 
youths, few in number, who have committed the most serious offences, 
for whom accountability and protection of the public may require an 
adult sentence, and perhaps even a lifetime in custody.  
It must, however, be appreciated that the limited moral and 
psychological development of adolescents requires that the justice 
system should generally hold them less accountable than adults who 
commit similar offences. Further, adolescents who end up serving all, or 
a portion, of their sentences in adult correctional facilities may pose a 
greater risk of re-offending than those who serve their entire sentences in 
the youth system.
59
 Thus, the legal regime for young offenders reserves 
                                                                                                             
58  See, e.g., New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G. (J.), [1999] 
S.C.J. No. 47, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46 (S.C.C.); and Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] 
S.C.J. No. 33, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 (S.C.C.). 
59  See, e.g., D.M. Bishop et al., “The Transfer of Juveniles to Criminal Court: Does it Make 
a Difference?” (1996) 42 Crime & Delinquency 171; Richard Redding, “Juvenile Transfer Laws: An 
Effective Deterrent to Delinquency”, [August 2008] Juvenile Justice Bulletin (see <http://www. 
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an adult sentence for the exceptional cases, those where a youth has been 
found guilty of the most serious offence and is likely to pose a significant 
risk to public safety if an adult sentence is not imposed.  
Adult sentencing for the most violent of young offenders may be 
justified on accountability principles and because of the need to protect 
society from those who pose a serious long-term risk, but it will not 
prevent violent youth offending. Placing an onus on the Crown to always 
justify with extraordinary treatment is consistent with the Supreme 
Court’s recognition of the constitutional presumption of diminished 
moral blameworthiness of youth and international law, as reflected in the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child.  
A reduction in serious violent offending cannot be achieved by a 
legal “quick fix”, but rather requires a resource-intensive combination of 
preventative, enforcement and rehabilitative services. Although there is 
no national data on adult sanctioning under the YCJA, it is clear that only 
a relatively small number of youth have received this sanction. Some 
argue that increasing the number of youth receiving adult sentences 
would increase social protection.
60
 However, experience and social 
science research from the United States clearly indicate that increasing 
the number of youths subject to adult sentences does not have a deterrent 
effect on other offenders or enhance the protection of society. The 
unfortunate reality is that those youths who commit the most serious and 
senseless crimes are precisely those who lack foresight and judgment, 
and who will not be deterred by adult sentences. Indeed, there is 
significant evidence that adolescents who are placed in adult prison are 
more likely to re-offend on release than adolescents who have committed 
the same offences and have the same prior records but are kept in youth 
custody facilities.
61
 This is not surprising when one considers the relative 
rehabilitative value and inmate subculture in the different types of 
custody facilities. 
                                                                                                             
ojp.usdoj.gov/ojjdp>); and Benjamin Steiner & Emily Wright, “Assessing the Relative Effects of 
State Direct File Waiver Laws on Violent Juvenile Crime: Deterrence or Irrelevance?“ (2006) 96 J. 
Crim. L. & Criminology 1451. 
60 D.M. Bishop et al., id. 
61  See D.L. Myers, “The Recidivism of Violent Youth in Juvenile and Adult Court: A 
Consideration of Selection Bias” (2003) 1 Youth Violence and Juvenile Justice 79; and L. Winner, 
L. Lanza-Kaduce, D.M. Bishop & C.E. Frazier, “The Transfer of Juveniles to Criminal Court: 
Reexamining Recidivism Over the Long Term” (1997) 43 Crime and Delinquency 548. 
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VII. CONCLUSION: THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF ADOLESCENCE 
While the decision in R. v. B. (D.) was controversial, it is submitted 
that it was correctly decided. The restrictive judicial approach to the 
adult sentencing provisions in the judgment of Abella J. is consistent 
with the intent of Parliament in enacting the YCJA, as revealed in the 
principles in the Act. These principles emphasize the special needs and 
vulnerabilities of youths as well as their amenability to rehabilitation, 
and recognize that youths should not be held as accountable for their 
crimes as adults. This protective approach is also consistent with the 
previous decisions of the Court interpreting the YCJA, decisions which 
were all “pro-youth”. Further, a narrow judicial approach to adult 
sentencing of youth is also consistent with a long history of special 
treatment of youth, and with Canada’s commitments under international 
law.  
For some criminal law issues, most notably in regard to youthful 
offenders being dealt with by the police and in courts, this is reflected in 
interpretations of the Charter which afford youth special protections. In 
other contexts, however, an approach to the Charter that takes account of 
the limited maturity of youth may result in decisions that afford youths 
fewer rights than adults, albeit only if the court accepts that this is 
necessary to promote their welfare.
62
  
In R. v. B. (D.) the Supreme Court established a constitutional 
foundation for the special, protective approach taken to youths in the 
criminal justice system. The Court has unanimously taken a new 
approach to section 7 of the Charter, adopting as one of the principles of 
fundamental justice the “principle of diminished moral blameworthiness” 
of youth, giving constitutional status to adolescence. While the Supreme 
Court was divided in the application of this principle in B. (D.), this 
newly recognized principle is very significant, and has already 
influenced how that Court
63
 and the lower courts
64
 are dealing with rights 
of youth to special and separate treatment from adults.  
                                                                                                             
62  See R. v. M. (M.R.), [1998] S.C.J. No. 83, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 393 (S.C.C.) and C. (A.) v. 
Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services), [2009] S.C.J. No. 30, 2009 SCC 30 (S.C.C.). 
63  The 2009 decision of the Supreme Court in R. v. L. (S.J.), supra, note 2, also recognized 
the need to protect youth, and interpreted the YCJA as prohibiting the trial of a young person with an 
adult co-accused. Trials with co-accused adults were permitted under the YOA if a youth charged 
with a very serious offence was transferred for trial into adult court. However, the Supreme Court 
ruled that the abolition of the pre-trial transfer process by the YCJA and the establishment of a 
process for making decisions about adult sentencing for youth only at the sentencing stage required a 
change in approach to joint trials. Justice Deschamps wrote (at para. 75):  
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The B. (D.) decision will also constrain future legislative reforms of 
youth justice legislation. In the 2008 election campaign, the Conservative 
Party again made toughening Canada’s youth justice laws an important 
issue, pledging to enact “new, balanced legislation” that would provide 
for “enhanced youth sentences” and “automatic, stiffer sentences for 
persons 14 and older convicted of serious and violent crimes such as 
murder and manslaughter”, as well as for the publication of names of 
youths 14 years and older who commit such crimes.
65 
Although there has 
been no general increase in youth crime since the YCJA came into effect, 
there is a political constituency for “toughening” youth justice laws. 
Some of the Conservative proposals, especially those dealing with 
                                                                                                             
the overall approach to youth justice — the effect of the objectives of the Act is that the 
judge is asked to favour rehabilitation, reintegration and the principle of a fair and 
proportionate accountability that is consistent with the young person’s reduced level of 
maturity. As for the adult criminal justice system, it places greater emphasis on 
punishment. There is no doubt that how the judge conducts the trial will reflect these 
different objectives. It would be much more difficult to maintain an approach favourable 
to a young person if he or she were being tried together with an adult, and the 
presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness to which the young person is entitled 
could be undermined as a result. (emphasis added) 
 While refusing to allow trials with adult co-accused, a majority of the Court accepted that the 
Crown may prefer a direct indictment of an accused youth under s. 577 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 
1985, c. C-46, just as it can for an adult, even if there is no preliminary inquiry or the charges are 
dismissed after a preliminary inquiry. Justice Abella dissented, focusing on the need to afford youth 
special legal protections. Although arguably the majority decision about direct indictments takes a 
narrower view of protection of youth than some prior Supreme Court jurisprudence, the decision 
should be understood in the context of recognizing any “right” to a preliminary inquiry. The Court 
seems to be signalling that in light of concerns about systemic delay, it will not be likely to rule 
unconstitutional efforts of Parliament to reform or abolish preliminary inquiries, provided accused 
persons get adequate Crown disclosure.  
64 In R. v. S. (C.), [2009] O.J. No. 1115 (Ont. C.J.) Cohen J. held that 2008 amendments to 
provisions of the Criminal Code, id., that govern the taking of DNA samples for inclusion in the 
national DNA databank from persons found guilty of “designated offences” violate ss. 7 and 8 of the 
Charter, to the extent that they apply to young persons. These amendments created a lengthy list of 
offences for which the taking of a sample is mandatory, a second list for which there is an onus on 
the youth to satisfy the court why a sample should not be taken, and a third list for which there is a 
Crown onus to justify the taking of the sample. Although the DNA order is not technically part of 
the sentencing process, the order for the taking of a sample is made at the time of sentencing. Justice 
Cohen relied heavily on R. v. B. (D.). in concluding that the mandatory and presumptive rules for the 
taking of DNA samples from youth were unconstitutional, as there needs to be individualized 
decision-making that takes into account the vulnerability of youth in general, as well as the youth’s 
age, record and amenability to rehabilitation, and the nature of the offence. She ruled that for all 
listed offences, the onus should be on the Crown to justify the taking of a DNA sample from a young 
person. 
65  Prime Minister Stephen Harper announced the Conservative proposals for YCJA reform 
in a speech on September 22, 2008. See “Balancing rehabilitation and responsibility”, September 22, 
2008. Online <http://www.conservative.ca/EN/1091/106115>. For media reports, see, e.g., C. Campbell, 
C. Alphonso & L. Perreaux, “Harper Pitches Two-Tier Youth Justice Plan”, The Globe and Mail, 
September 23, 2008, A1. 
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automatic “stiffer sentences” and publication of names of young 
offenders, are likely unconstitutional in light of R. v. B. (D.). Further, the 
decision seems certain to put to an end any further discussion in Canada 
of proposals to lower the age of adult criminal responsibility to 16 years 
of age (as it is in some American states). 
 
